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Abstract
The growing use of control access systems based on face recognition
shed light over the need for even more accurate systems to detect face
spoofing attacks. In this paper, an extensive analysis on face spoofing
detection works published in the last decade is presented. The analyzed
works are categorized by their fundamental parts, i.e., descriptors and
classifiers. This structured survey also brings a comparative performance
analysis of the works considering the most important public data sets in
the field. Themethodology followed in this work is particularly relevant to
observe temporal evolution of the field, trends in the existing approaches,
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to discuss still opened issues, and to propose new perspectives for the
future of face spoofing detection.
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1. Introduction
In the last decade, there has been an increasing interest in human au-
tomatic secure identification, being mainly based on unique personal bio-
metric information [1]. One of themain reasons for such focus concerns the
high number of security breaches and transaction frauds in non-biometric
systems, which are prone to be cracked due to inherent vulnerabilities [2],
like stolen cards and shared passwords, just to name a few.
Biometrics may use physical or behavioral characteristics for identi-
fication purposes, and different alternatives have been explored over the
years: fingerprint [3, 4, 5], hand geometry [6, 7], palmprint [8], voice [9, 10],
face [11, 12, 13], and handwritten signature [14]. Among those, face stands
out for its acceptability and recognition cost, turning out to be one of the
best option for a wide range of applications, from low-security uses (e.g.,
social media and smartphone access control) to high-security applications
(e.g., border control and video surveillance in critical places).
This popularity, however, comes with a price: face recognition systems
have become a major target of spoofing attacks. In such scenarios, an
impostor attempts to be granted in an identification process by forging
someone else’s identity. As procedures to replicate human faces are very
much standard nowadays (e.g., photo and 3D printing), spoofing detection
has become mandatory in any suitable face recognition system. Figure 1
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illustrates the complexity of this problem, and the following question can
be raised: ”Which half is real or fake?”. It is sometimes a very challenging
task, even for humans.
Several approaches for spoofing detection have been developed in the
last decade. Recently, two main surveys on the subject present a compre-
hensive review [15, 16]: in [15], a survey on anti-spoofing methods focuses
not only on face, but also on other biometric traits (e.g., iris, voice, finger-
print); in [16], face anti-spoofing methods are discussed by considering the
intrusiveness of each method, with few attention on comparative analy-
sis and temporal evolution of the field. On the other hand, the proposed
survey focuses only on face-oriented works, reviewing and analyzing the
most relevant works on face spoofing detection in the literature towards
depicting the advance of the detection methods in the last decade. An
extensive set of face anti-spoofingmethods is presented, also depicting the
evolution of the existing works. In this sense, trends denoted throughout
these years were pointed out, as well as open issues were remarked in
order to provide new directions on research topics in the future. Next, the
contributions of this survey are addressed and discussed in details with
Figure 1: Example of a half real (photo) and half fake face (photo of a photo). Which half
is the real one? The answer is the one on the left.
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respect to the other existing surveys, with special attention to the gaps
filled by the present work.
1.1. Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two surveys in the context
of face spoofing detection [15, 16]. Although two face anti-spoofing com-
petitions were organized [17, 18], and several data sets and methods have
been published, the amount of gathered data and results were not still
thorough and critically analyzed so far. Even these two existing surveys
do not concentrate efforts to understanding the trends of this research field
in terms of conception of the methods and results.
Galbally et al. [15] published a survey based on a chronological evolu-
tion of multimodal anti-spoofing methods. Although a special attention
was given to face anti-spoofing, other biometric traits were also presented
and discussed. A proposed timeline takes into consideration fingerprint,
iris, and face anti-spoofing detection competitions, being the latter one or-
ganized by one of the authors of the survey [15]. In regard to face-driven
works, the authors provided an extensive and comprehensive description
of different types of face attacks and public image data sets. The face anti-
spoofing methods, categorized by Galbally et al., were according to three
levels: sensor, features, and multi-modal fusion, but being only two levels
employed to classify the analyzed works. Sixteen existing works compose
the face study part, which was characterized by the level of the technique,
type of attack, public image data set used, and a single error rate. At the
end, a discussion was addressed showing that although competitive lab-
oratory performances were achieved, some people were successfully able
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to hack the fingerprint recognition system of the Iphone 5s. In [15], also,
some discussion about performance of face anti-spoofing methods resided
in general considerations about cross-data set performance evaluation (in
order to turn methods’ evaluation more thoroughly accomplished), new
relevant features acquired on facial blood flow, and new hardware that
could be used along with cameras to improve face anti-spoofing detec-
tion. The remainder of the survey in [15] discusses philosophical aspects
of performing an anti-spoofing detection approach within face recognition
systems.
Parveen et al. [16] followed a general architecture comprised of a sen-
sor, pre-processing, feature extraction, and classification steps as a basis
for a taxonomy of face anti-spoofing detection methods. The methods
are categorized as non-intrusive or intrusive ones, addressed according
to the stillness or motion detection presented in the detection process, re-
spectively. Twenty-nine face anti-spoofing methods were studied, and the
results of the existingworks were individually analyzed over public image
data sets. An experimental analysis was carried out bymeans of four error
measures: half total error rate (HTER), equal error rate (EER), area under curve
(AUC) and accuracy (ACC). At the end in [16], some pros and cons are
highlighted with regard to implementation complexity, user collaboration
and attack coverage.
Differently from Galbally et al. [15], which spread out the discussion on
various anti-spoofing methods using different traits, we present an exten-
sive survey that is focused on the evolution of particularly face spoofing
detection methods and existing benchmarks. Instead of following a more
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generic categorization as those proposed in [15, 16], all gathered works
here were organized in terms of their main component parts, i.e., descrip-
tors and classifiers (see Section 2). This taxonomy was devised to help the
reader to better understand the processes behind each countermeasure,
and to unveil technical trends concerning different types of attacks. Since
all works comprise features and learningmethods, this organization seems
to be the best to depict a big picture of the state-of-the-art research related
to face spoofing detection.
Despite the other two surveys, our work resorts to a quantitative and
analytical methodology (see Section 3) in order to support the analysis
of trends of the existing face anti-spoofing approaches (see Section 4). A
comparison of several methods was accomplished over the most currently
used public data sets, taking into account the bias of the metrics used to
assess face anti-spoofing performance (with several perfect results), dif-
ferently from [15] and [16], where the results were individually analyzed.
The goal is to numerically show how far spoofing detectors got consider-
ing only face. In order to fulfill such purposes, sixty-one face anti-spoofing
methods were gathered (including the works that participated in the two
competitions). Previous surveys did not include any in-depth assessment
of existing face spoofing detection approaches [15, 16], leaving unclear
which ways should be followed and what need to be done in techni-
cal terms, considering only face spoofing detection. Differently from the
philosophical and general discussion found in [15], concerning facts and
challenges in the spoofing detection domain, the numerical-driven evalua-
tion of the area allows suggesting other ways to evaluate the performance
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(avoiding supposedly perfect results), aswell as new future research topics
(e.g., deep learning [19], and collaborative clustering [20]) to be applied in
face anti-spoofing methods (see Section 4).
1.2. Methodology
This compilation of works is based on a literature search in the fol-
lowing data sets: Scopus1, IEEE Xplore2, Engineering Village3 and Google
Scholar4. On these sources, articles were consulted considering all pub-
lications with the following keywords: face recognition, face spoofing
detection, face liveness detection, countermeasure against spoofing at-
tacks and face anti-spoofing detection methods. The choice of the articles
was made according to the following criteria: (i) they should follow the
same protocol when evaluating the study; (ii) they should indicate the re-
sults using at least one of the metrics discussed in Subsection 3.2, (iii) they
should be comparable to other studies using the same data set, and finally
(iv) they must be peer-reviewed.
It is noteworthy that there were two competitions on face spoofing
detection referred in [17], [18]. The results obtained by the competition
teams were analyzed, and the names of the groups and universities were
used as references to the methods used in the first face spoofing detection
competition, such as: Ambient Intelligence Laboratory (AMILAB), Center
for Biometrics and Security Research, Institute of Automation, Chineses
1http://www.scopus.com/
2http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/home.jsp
3http://www.engineeringvillage.com/
4https://scholar.google.com
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Academy of Sciences (CASIA), Idiap Research Institute (IDIAP), Institute
of Intelligent Systems and Numerical Applications in Engineering, Uni-
versidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (SIANI), Institute of Computing,
Campinas University (UNICAMP) andMachine Vision Group, University
of Uolu (UOLU) [17]. As well as, the names CASIA, Fraunhofer Institute
for Computer Graphics Research (IGD), joint team from IDIAP, UOLU,
UNICAMP and CPqD Telecom & IT Solutions (MaskDown), the LNM
Institute of Information Technology, Jaipur (LNMIIT), Tampere Univer-
sity of Technology (MUVIS), University of Cagliari (PRA Lab),Universidad
Autonoma de Madrid (ATVS) and UNICAMP refer to the teams that partici-
pated in the second face spoofing detection competition [18]. Throughout
this text, these team names will be cited as the reference of the method in
the competition ([17] or [18]).
2. Face spoofing detection
Face spoofing detection [21, 22, 23, 24, 25], face liveness detection [26,
27, 28, 29, 30], countermeasure against facial spoofing attacks [31, 32, 33, 34,
35], and face anti-spoofing [36, 37, 38] are all terms interchangeably used to
denote methods to identify an impostor trying to masquerade him/herself
as a genuine user in facial recognition systems.
2.1. Types of face spoofing attacks
Face spoofing systems usually consider the following types of spoofing
attacks:
• The use of a flat printed photo (see Figure 2(b)) is the most common
one, with great potential to take place, since most people have facial
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pictures available on the Internet (e.g., social media) or could be
photographed by an impostor without collaboration or permission.
• In the eye-cut photo attack, eye regions of a printed photo are cut off
to exhibit blink behavior of the impostor (see Figure 2(c)).
• Warped photo attacks consist in bending a printed photo in any
direction to simulate facial motion (see Figure 2(d)).
• An attack via video playback shows almost all behaviors similar to
real faces, with many of the intrinsic features of valid user move-
ments (see Figure 2(e)). This type of attack has physiological signs
of life that are not presented in photos, such as eye blinking, facial
expressions, and movements in the head and mouth, and it can be
easily performed using tablets or large smartphones.
• Mask attacks are of two types: life-size wearable mask (see Fig-
ure 2(f)) and paper-cut mask (see Figure 2(g)). These attacks are
addressed to anti-spoofing systems that analyze 3D face structures,
being one of the most complex attacks to be detected. Mask manu-
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Figure 2: Types of face spoofing attack: (a) genuine user; (b) flat printed photo; (c) eye-cut
photo; (d) warped photo; (e) video playback; (f) life-size wearablemask and (g) paper-cut
mask.
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Table 1: Summary of the gathered works on face spoofing detection.
Descriptors Related works
Texture LBP and variations ([31, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42], IDIAP [17], MaskDown [18],
[21, 22, 28, 33, 34, 43, 44, 45, 46], UOULU [17], CASIA [18],
LNMIIT [18], Muvis [18], [47],[32, 48], MaskDown [18]), LPQ [28, 49],
LGS [50], ILGS [51], Texture (AMILAB [17], PRA Lab [18]),
MLPQ-TOP [52],MBSIF-TOP [52], LDP-TOP [53, 54],
HOG ([22, 23, 28, 45, 55], Gabor Wavelets ( [22], Muvis [18]),
GLCM ([23, 46, 57, 58], UNICAMP [17, 18], MaskDown [18]),
DoG( [27, 59],UNICAMP [17]), HSC ([12, 23], UNICAMP [17]),
AOS [60], DNN [61]
Motion CRF [62],OFL [12, 63, 64], HOOF [24], HMOF (CASIA [18]),
RASL ( [26], CASIA [17]),Motion Correlation ([31], CASIA [18]),
GMM ( [26, 65], CASIA [17], LNMIIT [18]), DMD [25],
Motion (SIANI [17], IGD [18])
Frequency 2D-DFT ([40, 53, 57, 58, 65, 66], UNICAMP [18]), 1D-FFT (CASIA [18]),
2D-FFT (LNMIIT [18]), Haar Wavelets ( [26], CASIA [17])
Color CF( [23], UNICAMP [17]), IDA [46, 67], IQA [38],
IQM (ATVS [18]), Color ([41, 49, 68], AMILAB [17], PRA Lab [18])
Shape CLM [29]
Reflectance Variational Retinex [30, 35, 43]
Classifiers Related works
Discriminant SVM ([22, 33, 34, 35, 43, 49, 55], CASIA [18], [21, 24, 32, 36, 37, 40, 41, 57, 67],
[25, 53, 54], (LNMIIT [18]), [28, 29, 31, 46, 59, 65], UOULU [17], AMILAB [17],
PRA Lab [18]), LDA ([24, 37, 38, 44], MaskDown [18], ATVS [18]),MLP [31],
NN [12], CNN [42, 48, 60, 61, 68], BN (SIANI [17]), Adaboost (IGD [18])
Regression LLR ( [31], MaskDown [18]), LR ([26], CASIA [17]), SLR [27], SLRBLR [30],
PLS ([23, 45, 57, 58], UNICAMP [17], Muvis [18]), KDA [52]
Distance Metric χ2 ([47], IDIAP [17]), Cosine [50, 51]
Heuristic Blink count [62], Thresholding [63, 66],Weighted sum [64]
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facturing is much more difficult and expensive than the other types
of attacks, requiring 3D scanning and printing special devices.
2.2. Taxonomy of face spoofing methods
Face recognition systems based on 2D and 3D images can be exposed to
spoofing attacks, which can be verified by different approaches. In order to
summarize them, we organized all gathered works in terms of descriptors
and classifiers. Descriptors were categorized as texture, motion, frequency,
color, shape or reflectance; while classifiers are organized as discriminant,
regression, distance metric or heuristic. Table 1 presents the summary of
the proposed taxonomy, and the descriptors and classifiers are respectively
discussed and analyzed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
2.3. Descriptors
2.3.1. Texture
Texture features are extracted from face images under the assumption
that printed faces produce certain texture patterns that do not exist in real
ones. Texture is probably the strongest evidence of spoofing, since more
than 69% of the works (see Table 1) use texture alone or combine it with
other descriptors in their countermeasures.
Different texture descriptors can be used to detect facial spoofing, but
local binary patterns (LBP) [39] is the very first choice, as it can be ob-
served in Table 1. Indeed, nearly half of the surveyed works explore LBP
or any of its variations. LBP is a grayscale, illumination-invariant, texture-
coding technique that labels every pixel by comparing itwith its neighbors,
concatenating the result into a binary number. The number of neighbors,
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neighborhood radius, and coding strategyare all parameters of themethod.
The final computed labels are then organized in histograms to describe the
texture, which can be performed for the entire image or even image paths.
Different LBP configurations can be found in spoofing detection, such as
the original LBP ([31, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42], IDIAP [17], MaskDown [18]),
multi-scale LBP ([21, 22, 28, 33, 34, 43, 44, 45, 46], UOULU [17], CASIA [18],
LNMIIT [18], Muvis [18]), LBP variance (LBPV) [47], and LBP from three
orthogonal planes (LBP-TOP) ([32, 48], MaskDown [18]). LBP-TOP can
be considered a hybrid texture-motion descriptor, since it combines both
spatial and temporal information. Other texture-coding techniques were
also explored for spoofing detection, including local phase quantization
(LPQ) [28, 49], which uses invariant blurring properties when extracting
features from images. This descriptor is a phase information of the locally
calculated Fourier spectrum for each position of the pixel in the image. Dif-
ferent approaches include local graph structure (LGS) [50] and improved
LGS (ILGS) [51]x’, which were used to extract texture features by com-
paring a target pixel and its neighboring pixels. Other methods have also
used texture descriptors in face spoofing detection competitions to analyze
face spoofing attacks (AMILAB [17], PRA Lab [18]). Multiscale local phase
quantization on three orthogonal planes (MLPQ-TOP) is an extension of
LPQ for time-varying texture analysis, which explores the blur-insensitive
characteristic of the Fourier phase spectrum [52]. Multiscale binarised sta-
tistical image feature descriptor on three orthogonal planes (MBSIF-TOP)
use filters based on statistical learning that represent spatio-temporal tex-
ture descriptors [52]. Dynamic texture descriptor can be found in local
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derivative pattern on three orthogonal planes (LDP-TOP) [53, 54]. LDP-
TOP analyzes discriminative textures of spectrum videos, where subtle
face movements occur over frames.
Histograms of oriented gradients (HOG) [22, 23, 28, 45, 55] is another
texture descriptor that represents the variation of gradient orientations
in different parts of the image in an illumination-invariant fashion. As
such, the magnitude of the gradients in different orientations are summed
in cells, which are lately combined in blocks. Bins, cells and blocks are
normalized at the end to compose the final feature vector.
Gabor wavelets have been also applied in multiple scales and orienta-
tions in order to extract texture information in image cells. Usually, Gabor
wavelets are calculated using mean and standard deviation of the magni-
tude of the coefficients at multiple scales and orientation ([22], Muvis [18]).
A compact and discriminant global representation can be achieved in
the gray level co-occurrence matrices (GLCM) [56]. GLCM describes the
joint probability of neighboring pixels, and different Haralick features can
be extracted from each matrix ([23, 46, 57, 58], MaskDown [18], UNI-
CAMP [18]).
Edge information can also be considered for texture representation. In
order to describe edges, difference of gaussians (DoG) are used to remove
lighting variations while preserving high frequency components [27, 59],
and histograms of shearlet coefficients (HSC) are used to estimate the dis-
tribution of edge orientations in a multi-scale analysis [12, 23]. Nonlinear
diffusion based on additive operator splitting (AOS) [60] is also used to
extract edge information for spoofing detection, applying a large time step
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to speed up the diffusing process and to distinguish the edges and surface
texture in the input image.
Finally, following a very recent trend in computer vision field, deep
neural networks (DNN) [61] are trained in order to provide adaptive fea-
tures which describe trainable texture.
2.3.2. Motion
Table 1 clearly shows that motion descriptors are the second in im-
portance for face spoofing detection, and there are two different ways of
considering motion for this purpose. One way is to detect and describe
intra-face variations, such as eye blinking, facial expressions and head
rotation. Conditional random fields (CRF) have been recently used to de-
termine eye closity and consequently detect blinking [62]; for global facial
movements, optical flow of lines (OFL) is used to measure spatio-temporal
variations of face images in horizontal and vertical orientations [12, 63, 64],
histogram of oriented optical flow (HOOF) and histogram of magnitudes
of optical flows (HMOF) are applied to create a binned representation of
facial motion directions and magnitudes (CASIA [18]); and robust align-
ment by sparse and low-rank decomposition (RASL) tries to align faces in
multiple frames and measure non-rigid motion ([26], CASIA [17]).
Another way of using motion is to evaluate the consistency of the user
interaction within the environment. In light of that, motion correlation
between face and background regions is computed ([31], CASIA [18]), as
well as, traditional background subtraction based on gaussian mixture
models (GMM) ([26, 65], CASIA [17], LNMIIT [18]).
Facial texture of an individual within a sequence of frames is explored
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by using the dynamic mode decomposition (DMD) [25], which extracts
features by means of eigenfaces in the snapshots displaced on temporal-
spatial. DMD is used in combination with LBP technique as a texture
descriptor, which is applied to capture evidences of human presence in a
video sequence, such as eye blink and movements of the lips. Finally, in
competitions, other types of methods have been used as a motion descrip-
tor to analyze face spoofing attacks (SIANI [17], IGD [18]).
2.3.3. Frequency
Frequency-based countermeasures take advantage of certain image ar-
tifacts that occur in spoofing attacks. 2D discrete Fourier transform (2D-
DFT), and 1D and 2D fast Fourier transform (1D-FFT, 2D-FFT) are calcu-
lated to find these artifacts in single [40] or multiple images ([53, 57, 58,
65, 66], CASIA [18], LNMIIT [18], UNICAMP [18]). When one considers
multiple images, the concept of Visual Rhythms is used to merge multiple
Fourier spectra in a single map that represents spatial frequency informa-
tion over time, and then HOG, LBP and/or GLCM can be used for final
face representation. When specifically considering color banding, which
concerns abrupt changes caused by inaccurate print or screen flicker, Haar
wavelets decomposition can be applied to find large unidirectional varia-
tions ([26], CASIA [17]).
2.3.4. Color
Although colors do not remain constant due to lighting variations, cer-
tain dominant characteristics are considerable clues to discriminate impos-
tors from genuine faces. In this context, color frequency (CF) histograms
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describe thedistribution of colors in an image( [23], UNICAMP [17]). These
histograms are computed for different blocks of the image, as performed
by HOG, using three bins to encode the number of pixels with the highest
gradient magnitude in each color channel. Image moments globally de-
scribe face liveness by means of image distortion analysis (IDA) [46, 67],
image quality assessment (IQA) [38] and image quality measures (IQM)
(ATVS [18]). IDA was proposed to extract characteristics through the
HSV and RGB color spaces, smoothing and light intensity. IQA allows to
maximize both critical performance measures in a complete face spoofing
detection. IQM aims to show that the lowest values, obtained by quality
measurements, produced with Gaussian filtering are samples of impostor
face. YCbCr and HSV color spaces are used as color descriptors in [41, 49].
In [68], each channel of RGB color space was used for feature extraction.
Other methods have been used as color descriptors, used in competitions,
to analyze face spoofing attacks (AMILAB [17], PRA Lab [18]).
2.3.5. Shape
Shape information is very useful to deal with printed photo attacks,
since facial geometry can not be reproduced in a planar surface. Active
contours based on constrained local models (CLM) are used to detect facial
landmarks in a video sequence. These landmarks define then a sparse 3D
structure that describes the planarity of the face [29].
2.3.6. Reflectance
Considering that genuine and impostor faces behave differently in the
same illumination conditions, it is possible to use the reflectance infor-
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mation to distinguish them. To accomplish that, the Variational Retinex
method decomposes an input image into reflectance and illumination com-
ponents [30, 35, 43] in order to analyze the entire image.
2.4. Classifiers
2.4.1. Discriminant
The idea behind discriminant techniques is to distinguish different
classes by minimizing intra-class variation and/or maximizing inter-class
variation. This type of classifier is explored in approximately 64% of the
gathered works.
As evidenced in Table 1, works use a discriminant classifier alone or
alongwith others in their frameworks. Support vectormachines (SVM) are
the most common classification technique in spoofing detection, and often
presents superior performance. In order to achieve that, SVM finds opti-
mal hyperplanes to separate descriptors from genuine and impostor faces.
When these classes are not linearly separable, different kernel functions
can be used to obtain a nonlinear classifier. Although linear SVM has been
extensively used in different countermeasures ([22, 33, 34, 35, 43, 49, 55, 57],
CASIA [18]), radial basis function kernel ([21, 24, 32, 36, 37, 40, 41, 57, 67]),
and histogram intersection kernel [25, 53, 54] have also been applied to in-
crease the classification accuracy. Different SVM versions can also be con-
sidered, such as Hidden Markov Support Vector Machines (LNMIIT [18]).
In ( [28, 29, 31, 46, 59, 65], UOULU [17], AMILAB [17], PRA Lab [18] ),
however, the authors do not describe the type of SVM kernel used in the
experiments.
As an alternative to linear approaches, the linear discriminant analysis
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(LDA) ([24, 37, 38, 44], MaskDown [18], ATVS [18]) explicitly models the
difference between classes and within classes to address the classification
task, with an advantage of being used for dimensionality reduction.
Other types of classifiers use discriminant procedures to accomplish
face spoofingdetection: multilayer perceptron (MLP) [31]wasused to eval-
uate whether excessive movement (flat printed photo-strike by hand) or
nomovement (flat printed photo strike attached to amedia) had variations
during anN video sequence; neural network (NN) [12] is good at learning
implicit patterns, which is able to recognizemotion cues for spoofing detec-
tion with proper training. NN is trained by a backpropagation procedure
using a labeled data set through an autoencoder, which is treated as a pre-
training process; convolutional neural networks (CNN) [42, 48, 60, 61, 68]
uses trainable features with shared weights and local connections between
different layers, where all weights in all layers of a CNN network are
learned through training. A CNN aims to learn invariance representations
of scale, translation, rotation and related transformations on a trainable-
based feature framework. Bayesian network (BN) (SIANI [17]) provides a
probabilistic method by extending Bayess rule for updating probabilities
in the light of new evidences. Adaboost is a type of ensemble classifier that
speeds up the process of finding discrimination of impostor and genuine
users (IGD [18]).
2.4.2. Regression
The regression-based classification maps use input descriptors directly
into their class labels considering a predictive model obtained from known
pairs of descriptors and labels. They have been widely used for spoofing
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detection due to their simplicity, accuracy and efficiency. Different regres-
sion methods are referred in the literature: linear logistic regression (LLR)
([31], MaskDown [18]) was used for the combination of information ex-
tracted through two descriptors; for the combination of correlative motion
and texture (e.g., LBP) applications, usingMLPand SVMclassifiers, respec-
tively; logistic regression (LR) ([26], CASIA [17]) is a confidence quantifi-
cation of every feature representation, which in the final scores are fused
by weight sum rule, and the weights of different classifiers are learned
on validation set using grid search; sparse logistic regression (SLR) [27]
analyzes different lighting conditions and regions of high frequency for
detecting images made by impostors; sparse low rank bilinear logistic re-
gression (SLRBLR) [30] was explored in imageswith prominent reflectance
and illumination, using two techniques to extract these characteristics of
the image, being reflectance based on variational retinex, and the illumi-
nation based on the DoG technique in the identification of medium-high
frequency bands; partial least square (PLS) ([23, 45, 57, 58], UNICAMP [17],
Muvis [18]) is calculated from a linear transformation on the features ex-
tracted by descriptors using weighting methods.
Kernel discriminant analysis (KDA) is a regression classifier, which
projects the input data onto a discriminative spectral subspace, avoiding
the computational time found in eigen-analysis [52]. In other words, KDA
uses projective functions (vectors) based on eigen-decomposition of kernel
matrix, being costly when applied to a large number of training samples.
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2.4.3. Distance Metric
The use of distance metrics is supposed to improve the performance
in face spoofing detection systems, with the goal of measuring the dissim-
ilarities among samples. However, these approaches usually require an
exhaustive search to accomplish the classification task, which may lead to
a high cost in large reference sets. Chi-square (χ2) ([47], IDIAP [17]) and
cosine distance [50, 51] are common choices to this end, and they are used
to compute the cumulative distance of a probe face (that one to be identi-
fied) and the entire reference set to decide whether the face is genuine or
impostor.
2.4.4. Heuristic
Different heuristics have been used to decide whether a face is real or
fake. As a drawback, heuristics may lead to overfitting, specially when
only self-collected data is considered. Number of eye blinks [62], motion
measurements thresholding [63], average pixel ratio thresholding [66] and
weighted sum of motion measurements [64] are examples of heuristics
found in the literature.
3. Quantitative evaluation of the surveyed works
Results reported in the surveyed papers were grouped according to the
data sets used in their experiments. All numerical values in our study are
the exact same values presented in their original works, which followed
the same evaluation protocol.
20
Table 2: Summary of available face spoofing data sets.
Year Data set #Subjects #Real/Fake Type of attack
2010 NUAA Photograph Imposter [30] 15 5105/7509 1. Flat printed photo
2. Warped photo
2011 Yale Recaptured [27] 10 640/1920 1. Flat printed photo
2011 Print-Attack [69] 50 200/200 1. Flat printed photo
2012 Replay-Attack [36] 50 200/1000 1. Flat printed photo
2. Video playback
2012 Casia Face Anti-Spoofing [59] 50 150/450 1. Warped photo
2. Eye-cut photo
3. Video playback
2013 Kose and Dugelay [33] 20 200/198 1. Mask
2013 3D Mask Attack [37] 17 170/85 1. Mask
2014 MSU-MFSD [67] 35 70/210 1. Flat printed photo
2. Video playback
2015 UVAD [58], [70] 404 808/16268 1. Video playback
3.1. Data sets
Nine publicly available data sets were chosen to evaluate the methods:
Concerning 2D attacks, NUAA Photograph Imposter [30], Yale Recap-
tured [27], Print-Attack [69], Replay-Attack [36], Casia FaceAnti-Spoofing [59],
MSU-MFSD [67] and UVAD ([58],[70]) are the most known and used in the
literature; with respect to mask attacks, Kose and Dugelay’s data set [33]
and 3D Mask Attack data set [37] are the only two found in the literature.
General characteristics of each data set are summarized in Table 2, and
more details can be found in [27, 30, 33, 36, 37, 59, 69].
NUAA Photograph Imposter data set5 [30] is one of the first publicly
available data sets for face spoofingdetection evaluation. Images inNUAA
were collected by cheap webcams in three sessions on different environ-
ments and under different illumination conditions, with an interval of two
5http : //parnec.nuaa.edu.cn/xtan/NUAAImposterDB download.html
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weeks between each session. The evaluated attack is a printed photo,
which can be flat or warped. These photo attacks were prepared using A4
paper and a color printer.
The main goal of the Yale Recaptured data set6 [27] was to have im-
postor images in multiple illumination conditions. As such, texture-based
methods are commonly employed over this data set. Static images were
collected with a distance of 50 centimeters between the display and the
camera.
The Print-Attack data set7 [69] was used to benchmark different works
in the first spoofing detection competition [17]. This data set was created
by showing a flat printed photo of a genuineuser to an acquisition sensor in
two ways: Hand-held (i.e., the impostor holds the photo using the hands)
or fixed support (i.e., photos are stuck on a wall).
Replay-Attack data set8 [36] is an extension of the Print-Attack data set
to evaluate spoofing in videos and photos, and it was used in the second
spoofing detection competition [18]. It consists of 1,300 video clips of photo
and video attacks. All images and videos were collected under different
lighting conditions, and three different attacks modes were considered:
printed photo in high-resolution and video playbacks, using a mobile
phone with low-resolution screen, and a 1024×768 pixels ipod screen.
Casia Face Anti-Spoofing data set9 [59] contains seven scenarios with
different types of attack and a variety of image qualities. This data set
6http : //ic.unicamp.br/ rocha/pub/downloads/2011icip/
7https : //www.idiap.ch/dataset/printattack/downloadproc
8https : //www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack/downloadproc
9http : //www.cbsr.ia.ac.cn/english/FaceAntiSpoo f datasets.asp
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presents three types of attacks: warped photo, eye-cut photo and video
playback. Kose andDugelay’s data set10 [33] is a paid-maskdata set created
by the MORPHO company. Subjects were captured by a 3D scanner that
uses a structured light technology to obtain genuine images of facial shape
and texture. After that, masks for those images were manufactured by
Sculpteo 3D Printing11, and then recaptured by the same sensor to obtain
impostor images.
3DMask-Attackdata set (3DMAD)12 [37]was thefirst publicly available
data set for mask attacks, and it consists of video sequences recorded
by an RGB-D camera. Masks were manufactured using the services of
ThatsMyFace13, and one frontal and two profile images of each subject for
that purpose were required.
MSU Mobile Face Spoofing data set (MSU MFSD)14[67] consists of 280
video clips of print photo and video attack attempts to 35 participants. All
printed photos used for attacks were created with a state-of-the-art color
printer on larger sized paper. In order to perform an attack, video playback
from each participant was taken under the similar conditions as in their
authentication sessions.
UnicampVideo-Attack data set (UVAD)15[58, 70] is comprised of videos
of valid accesses and attacks of 404 subjects, all built at Full HD quality,
recorded at 30 frames per second and nine seconds long. All videos were
10http : //www.morpho.com/
11http : //www.sculpteo.com/en/
12https : //www.idiap.ch/dataset/3dmad/download− proc
13http : //www.thatsmy f ace.com/Products/products.html
14http : //www.cse.msu.edu/rgroups/biometrics/Publications/datasets/MSUMobileFaceSpoo f ing/index.htm
15http : // f igshare.com/articles/visualrhythmantispoo f ing/1295453
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created by filming each person in two sections under different lighting
conditions, backgrounds and places (indoors and outdoors).
Table 3: Summary of non-public face spoofing data sets.
Year data set #Subjects #Real/Fake Types of attacks
2012 Pinto et al. [57] 50 100/600 1. Video playback
2012 BERCWebcam [40] 25 1408/7461 1. Flat printed photo
2012 BERC ATM [40] 20 1797/5802 1. Flat printed photo
2013 Wang et al. [29] 50 750/2250 1. Flat printed photo
2. Warped photo
Other non-public data sets are proposed in [29, 40, 57]. In [57], the data
setwas introduced to detect video-based spoofing. Kim et al. [40] proposed
twodifferent data sets called BERCWebcamandBERCATM,which consist
of images taken from live people and four types of 2-D papermasks (photo,
print, magazine, caricature). Wang et al. [29] created an image data set for
photo attack evaluation using flat-printed and warped photos. Table 3
summarizes the main characteristics of the aforementioned data sets.
3.2. Performance Metrics
A spoofing detection system is subject to two types of errors: an im-
postor can be accepted as a genuine user (i.e. number of false acceptance
- NFA), or a genuine user can be considered as an impostor (i.e., number
of false rejection - NFR). The probability of these errors to occur are re-
spectively called false acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR).
These rates present an inversely proportional relation. A receiver operat-
ing characteristics (ROC) curve is obtained by computing all possible pairs
of FAR and FRR values, as illustrated in Fig. 3. The integral of a ROC
curve is known as the area under curve (AUC), i.e., the gray-filled area in
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Figure 3: Relation among the metrics on the ROC curve.
Table 4: Metrics commonly applied on face spoofing evaluation.
Metric Stand for Equation Type
FAR False Acceptance Rate FAR =
NFA
#Impostor
Error
FRR False Rejection Rate FRR =
NFR
#Genuine)
Error
EER Equal Error Rate EER = (FAR = FRR) Error
HTER Half Total Error Rate HTER =
FAR + FRR
2
Error
ACC Accuracy 100 ×
(
1 −
FAR×#Impostor+FRR×#Genuine
#Impostor+#Genuine
)
Hit
AUC Area Under Curve Area =
∫ b
a
f (x) dx, where f : [a,b]→ R Hit
Fig. 3. Also, the point of the ROC curve where FAR equals FRR is called
equal error rate (EER), and the point where the average of FAR and FRR is
minimal is called half total error rate (HTER). Finally, the overall accuracy
(ACC) considers both genuine users and impostors along with the FAR
and FRR. Table 4 summarizes all the aforementioned metrics.
Since most of the considered data sets are not balanced (i.e., the number
of impostors and genuine images is different), ACC may lead to a biased
performance analysis. All other metrics are based on a separate evaluation
of FAR and FRR, so they are more reliable for a comparative analysis. For
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these reasons, surveyed works were compared using metrics according to
the following order of preference: EER, HTER, AUC and ACC.
3.3. Performance analysis of the existing spoofing detectors
Comparing different works is a difficult task, since most of the time
we do not have access to the original source codes, and reproducing codes
and experimental results are very complicated. For that reason, we have
decided to perform this comparison by using the results reported in the
gathered papers. However, determination of the best method based on the
reported results is not an easy task. It is possible to make mistakes even
when comparingworks that use the very samedata set, specially if this data
set is prone to be biased [71]. Strictly speaking, besides a common available
data set, it is of underlying importance to follow the same methodology
and to have the same metrics when comparing different countermeasures.
Given the data sets presented in Section 3.1, some criteria were adopted
to select which works should be considered in our analysis: (i) they must
follow the same data set protocol; (ii) they must report its results using
at least one of the metrics discussed in Section 3.2; and (iii)they must be
comparable to other works using the same data set (i.e. use the most
commonmetrics for that data set). On that account, some works were then
removed from the analysis for NUAA [36, 50, 51], Print-Attack [26, 28],
Replay-Attack [45, 66], Casia Face Anti-Spoofing [25, 36, 38, 45, 65, 67, 68],
Kose and Dugelay’s [34], 3DMAD [44, 65] data sets and other works in
[62, 63, 64]. Therefore, such works are not presented in Table 1 and Fig. 4.
Tables 5-12 summarize the selected results. It is noteworthy that sometimes
it was necessary to take conclusions by indirectly comparing different
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metrics, as in Table 5.
Table 5: Results over NUAA Imposter data set.
Reference Features Classifier EER (%) AUC ACC (%)
2010, Tan et al. [30] Variational Retinex SLRBLR - 0.94 -
2011, Maatta et al. [21] LBP SVM 2.90 0.99 98.00
2011, Peixoto et al. [27] DoG SLR - - 93.20
2011, Schwartz et al. [23] CF + HOG +HSC + GLCM PLS 8.20 0.96 -
2012, Maatta et al. [22] LBP + Gabor Wavelets + HOG SVM 1.10 0.99 -
2012, Kose and Dugelay [47] LBPV χ 2 11.97 - -
2013, Yang et al. [28] LBP + LPQ +HOG SVM 1.90 0.99 97.70
2015, Arashloo et al. [52] MLPQ-TOP +MBSIF-TOP KDA 1.80 - -
2017, Alotaibi and
Mahmood [60] AOS CNN - - 99.00
2017, Souza et al. [42] LBP CNN 1.80 0.99 98.20
Table 5 summarizes the results of the methods concerning the NUAA
data set, and the most common metrics were EER, AUC and ACC. This
data set presents a relatively balanced number of positives and negatives
samples, which avoids biased results when using ACC. Peixoto et al. [27]
did not report both EER and AUC, but their ACC shows that they did not
achieve the best performance. As it can be observed in Table 5, methods
with high AUC have low EER. Although AUC does not allow us to differ
between the methods proposed byMaatta et al. [21, 22] and Yang et al. [28],
EER clearly shows that Maatta et al. [22] achieved the best performance for
the NUAA data set.
A summary of the results considering the Yale Recaptured data set is
presented in Table 6. Works using this data set were compared bymeans of
ACC, the onlymetric in common to all of them. Since this data set is highly
unbalanced (i.e., a ratio of 1:3), ACCwould not be the most recommended
metric. For this comparison, however, the use of ACC is not an issue due
27
Table 6: Results over Yale Recaptured data set.
Reference Features Classifier ACC (%)
2011, Peixoto et al. [27] DoG SLR 91.70
2012, Maatta et al. [22] LBP +Gabor Wavelets +HOG SVM 100.00
Table 7: Results over Print-Attack data set.
Reference Features Classifier HTER (%)
2011, IDIAP [17] LBP χ 2 0.00
2011, UOULU [17] LBP SVM 0.00
2011, CASIA [17] RASL + GMM + LR 0.00
Haar Wavelets
2011, AMILAB [17] Color + Texture SVM 0.63
2011, SIANI [17] Motion BN 10.63
2011, UNICAMP [17] and
Schwartz et al. [23] CF +HOG +HSC + GLCM PLS 0.63
2012, Maatta et al. [22] LBP +Gabor Wavelets +HOG SVM 0.00
2013, Bharadwaj et al. [24] HOOF LDA 0.62
2015, Tirunagari et al. [25] DMD + LBP SVM 0.00
to the perfect performance reported [22], which means that both classes
were perfectly classified.
As stated in Section 3.1, the Print-Attack data set was used as a bench-
mark in the first spoofing detection competition [17], wherein three works
achieved perfect score (i.e., IDIAP [17], UOULU [17] and CASIA [17]).
Later works [22, 25] also achieved 0% of HTER (see Table 7), andMaatta et
al. [22] reached the best performance in a third data set. As shown in Ta-
ble 2, NUAA, Yale Recaptured and Print-Attack data sets are solely based
on printed photo attacks. Given the work in [22] achieved the lowest error
rates in all of the attacks using the same approach, it is safe to assume that
multiple texture features (i.e., LBP, Gabor wavelets and HOG) and an SVM
classifier are enough to detect printed photo attacks over that data set.
The Replay-Attack data set was used in the second spoofing detection
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competition [18], and both CASIA and LNMIIT obtained 0% of HTER.
There is a proposed method in [12], which also achieved a perfect HTER
(see Table 8). This data set has an uneven number of real and fake images
(i.e., a ratio of 1:5), but it does not influence the analysis since all works
report their results using the same metric.
The Casia Face Anti-Spoofing data set is characterized by the highest
number of types of attacks, as presented in Table 2, but presenting a low
number of samples. Table 9 presents the results on this data set, and
Boulkenafet et al. [49] proposed the method with the best performance,
reaching perfect results (i.e., 3.20% EER).
Tables 10 and 11 present, respectively, the spoofing detection results for
mask attacks over Kose and Dugelay’s and 3DMask Attack data sets. The
best performance over that data set was achieved by the method based on
texture and reflectance descriptors, and an SVM classifier. The number of
fake images in the 3D Mask Attack data set was greater than the number
of real ones, but works were evaluated using HTER; so unbalancing is not
a problem. Menotti et al. [61] obtained the best performance by combining
deep learning and SVM. Methods dealing with video playback and mask
attacks did not rely only on texture descriptors, exploring different features
(i.e., motion, frequency and reflectance) to reduce the classification error.
SVM is still the most preferred classifier.
Table 12 summarizes the results over UVAD and MSU-MFSD datasets.
The first one was only used by one work, while in the second Kim et al. [49]
achieved the lowest EER. Table 13 shows results over non-public data sets,
and it is only presented for completeness, since it is not easy reproducible.
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Table 8: Results over Replay-Attack data set.
Reference Features Classifier HTER (%)
2012, Chingovska et al. [36] LBP SVM 15.16
2012, Freitas et al. [32] LBP-TOP SVM 7.60
2013, Komulainen et al. [31] Motion Correlation + LBP LLR + SVM 5.11
+MLP
2013, Bharadwaj et al. [24] HOOF + LBP LDA 1.25
2013, CASIA [18] LBP + 1D-FFT + HMOF SVM 0.00
+Motion Correlation
2013, IGD [18] Motion Adaboost 9.13
2013, MaskDown [18] LBP + GLCM + LBP-TOP LLR + LDA 2.50
2013, LNMIIT [18] LBP + GMM + 2D-FFT SVM 0.00
2013, Muvis [18] LBP + Gabor Wavelets PLS 1.25
2013, PRA Lab [18] Color + Texture SVM 1.25
2013, ATVS [18] IQM LDA 12.00
2013, UNICAMP [18] 2D-DFT + GLCM SVM 15.62
2014, Galbally et al. [38] IQA LDA 15.20
2015, Menotti et al. [61] DNN CNN 0.75
2015, Tirunagari et al. [25] DMD + LBP SVM 3.75
2015, Wen et al. [67] IDA SVM 7.41
2015, Pinto et al. [58] 2D-DFT PLS 14.27
2015, Boulkenafet et al. [41] LBP + Color SVM 2.90
2015, Arashloo et al. [52] MLPQ-TOP +MBSIF-TOP KDA 1.00
2015, Pinto et al. [65] GMM + 2D-DFT SVM 2.75
2016, Boulkenafet et al. [49] LPQ + Color SVM 3.30
2016, Feng et al. [12] HSC + Optical Flow NN 0.00
2016, Kim et al. [46] MLBP + GLCM + IDA SVM 5.50
2016, Phan et al. [54] LDP-TOP SVM 1.75
2017, Alotaibi and
Mahmood [60] AOS CNN 10.00
2017, Lakshminarayanaet al. [68] Color CNN 0.80
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Table 9: Results over Casia Face Anti-Spoofing data set.
Reference Features Classifier EER (%)
2012, Zhang et al. [59] DoG SVM 17.00
2013, Komulainen et al. [55] HOG SVM 3.30
2013, Yang et al. [28] LPQ + LBP + HOG SVM 11.80
2015, Boulkenafet et al. [41] LBP + Color SVM 6.20
2016, Boulkenafet et al. [49] LPQ + Color SVM 3.20
2016, Feng et al. [12] HSC + Optical Flow NN 5.83
2016, Kim et al. [46] MLBP + GLCM + IDA SVM 4.89
2016, Phan et al. [54] LDP-TOP SVM 8.94
2017, Asim et al. [48] LBP-TOP CNN 8.02
Table 10: Results of different methods over Kose and Dugelay’s data set.
Reference Features Classifier AUC ACC (%)
2013, Kose and Dugelay [35] Variational Retinex SVM 0.97 94.47
2013, Kose and Dugelay [33] LBP SVM 0.98 93.50
2014, Kose and Dugelay [43] LBP + SVM 0.99 98.99
Variational Retinex
Table 11: Results over 3D Mask Attack data set.
Reference Features Classifier HTER (%)
2013, Erdogmus and Marcel [37] LBP LDA 0.95
2015, Menotti et al. [61] DNN CNN 0.00
2016, Feng et al. [12] HSC + Optical Flow NN 0.00
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Table 12: Results over UVAD and MSU-MFSD data set.
Data set Reference Features Classifier HTER (%) EER (%)
UVAD 2015, GMM
Pinto et al. [65] + 2D-DFT SVM 29.87 -
UVAD 2017, 2D-DFT
Phan et al. [53] + LDP-TOP SVM 23.69 -
MSU- 2015,
MFSD Wen et al. [67] IDA SVM - 5.82
MSU- 2016, LPQ
MFSD Boulkenafet et al. [49] + Color SVM - 3.50
MSU- 2016,
MFSD Phan et al. [54] LDP-TOP SVM 7.70 6.54
MSU- 2016, MLBP
MFSD Kim et al. [46] GLCM + IDA SVM - 2.44
Table 13: Results of different methods over other non-public data sets.
Data set Features Classifier EER (%) ACC (%)
BERCWebcam [40] LBP + 2D DFT SVM 8.43 -
BERC ATM [40] LBP + 2D DFT SVM 4.42 -
Self Collected [57] GLCM + 2D DFT PLS - 100.00
Self Collected [57] GLCM + 2D DFT SVM - 100.00
Self Collected [29] CLM SVM - 100.00
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4. Discussion and analysis
Most of the effort to address the problem of face spoofing detection
have been carried out over the past decade. Henceforth we provide a big
picture of the field (trends), aswell as the analysis of open issues and future
perspectives that could be tackled and followed in order to leverage the
face spoofing systems.
4.1. Timeline and trends of the state-of-the-art works
Figure 4 depicts a chronological arrangement of the surveyed works in
order to demonstrate the convergence of descriptors and classifiers over
the time.
From 2007 to 2010, spoofing detectors were mostly focused on the anal-
ysis of motion or reflectance, since both types of descriptors are based on
a quite straightforward observation: printed faces do not behave or reflect
light as real faces do. Although such countermeasures have persisted to
date, another image cue has grown in importance in the literature: face
texture. As pointed out by Tan et al. [30], an impostor face is captured
by a camera twice, while a genuine-user once. The former consequently
produces artifacts that are not presented in real face acquisition. These arti-
facts are very perceptible in texture images, and texture coding techniques
seem to be an effective way to capture and describe them, as evidenced in
the number of works relying on traditional texture description approaches
and their variations from 2011 to 2017.
In terms of classification, SVM-based works became more and more
popular to the point of dominating the face spoofing literature in recent
33
Figure 4: Timeline of face spoofing detection in the last decade.
years, which is somehow expected, since SVM has gained a wide attention
in many other machine learning tasks, such as medical diagnosis [72], ob-
ject recognition [73] and market analysis [74]. In fact, even if we consider
only face processing applications, there are severalways of exploring SVM:
face recognition [75], face detection [76], facial landmark extraction [77],
facial expression analysis [78], and so forth. Although SVM provides very
accurate results, the two most researched and up-to-date of these applica-
tions (i.e., detection and recognition) are recently getting better results us-
ingdeep learningmethods [79, 80]. Thus, we expect to see an attention shift
34
towards deep learning in spoofing detection works for the next few years,
which can already be seen in the most recent literature [61, 60, 68, 42, 48].
4.2. Open issues
After surveying all existing face spoofing detection methods in the last
decade, it is still difficult to establish if there was a remarkable progress in
this field. The main points that support this view are the following:
1. Automatic detection of impostors by face still follows the same recipe
as many other computer vision problems: first extracting some fea-
tures for further classifying them by a supervised predictor. More-
over, most works follow the same architecture of popular face recog-
nition systems, using similar feature sets and classification methods.
This is even more evident if one observes Table 14, where the best
performing works over all data sets considered in our review are
shown. As stated in Section 4, texture-based descriptors and SVM-
based classificationhaveprevailed in the face spoofing literature. The
combination texture+SVM has reached the best performance in five
out of the nine data sets analyzed. For the remaining two, texture
and SVM are still there, but combined with other descriptors (i.e.,
motion, frequency or reflectance).
2. Most of the time, spoofing detection follows face recognition trends.
For instance, deep learning techniques are becoming very popular
in face recognition [81] and have consistently outperformed other
existing methods, just like what happened to LBP+SVM few years
before. As demonstrated, Menotti et al. [61] recently employed deep
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learning for face spoofing detection, evaluating the performance of
the proposed method on two data sets: Replay-Attack and 3D Mask
Attack. Their results were comparable to the state-of-the-art in the
first one, and are the best performance so far in the second one. This
practically shows that any face recognition breakthroughs will lead
to improvements on texture-based spoofing detection as well.
3. All surveyedworks perform training and testing using the same data
set (although in a non-overlapping way). They presented their re-
sults with different metrics (i.e. ACC, AUC, HTER and EER) and
near perfect results were found for each of the nine publicly avail-
able data sets considered in this work. Far from showing that face
spoofing detection is a solved problem, this fact actually indicates
the lack of a challenging data set that allows a thoroughly analysis of
the proposed methods. Other computer vision problems have been
conducted in this direction, like person re-identification with VIPER
data set [82] and object recognition with Caltech-256 Object Cate-
gory data set [83], both with state-of-the-art accuracy below 50%. We
believe that a large data set in a wild scenario is more likely to pro-
mote breakthroughs. In addition to a large amount of images and/or
videos, multiple types of attacks should be covered, be diverse in
terms of ethnicity, age and gender, and present real-world scenarios
with different environments, acquisition devices, lighting conditions,
and human behaviors.
4. A lack of a standard evaluation protocol for spoofing detectionmeth-
ods is also an issue. Currently, most of the researchers use HTER and
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EER for detection results to avoid biased results when a data set is
unbalanced, but these metrics do not show the effects of spoofing de-
tection on the recognition step. Chingovska et al. [84] introduced an
evaluation protocol for biometric systems under spoofing attacks that
simultaneously analyzes both recognition and spoofing detection re-
sults through expected performance and spoofability curves (EPSC)
by dividing a data set in three categories: genuine users, zero-effort
impostors and spoofing attacks. However, the proposed evaluation
method depends on a prior probability of the spoofing attacks, or
a cost relation between the ratio of incorrectly accepted zero-effort
impostors and the ratio of incorrectly accepted spoofing attacks. The
latter ones could vary for different systems, adding more variables
to the problem. Hence, a more intuitive and self-explanatory evalu-
ation metric is also required to instigate future efforts in this research
topic. This also extends to benchmarks that rigorously evaluate both
recognition and spoofing detection, which are currently not available
in the literature.
In general, existing works seem to be going towards data set tuning
(i.e. overfitting) instead of designing more effective and flexible solutions.
This is corroborated by the works of Pereira et al. [85] and Pinto et al. [65],
which show initial cross-data set performance analyses using Casia Face
Anti-Spoofing and Replay-Attack data sets. Different methods were eval-
uated by Pereira et al. [85], and Tables 15 and 16 show the results for the
two most interesting ones, respectively, (1) Motion Correlation+MLP; and
(2) LBP-TOP+SVM. While LBP-TOP+SVM presents the best performance
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Table 14: Best performing works over different data sets
Reference Features Classifier Data set
Maatta et al. [22] LBP + SVM NUAA Imposter
Gabor Wavelets + Yale Recaptured
HOG Print-Attack
IDIAP [17] LBP χ 2 Print-Attack
UOULU [17] LBP SVM Print-Attack
CASIA [17] RASL + GMM +
Haar wavelets LR Print-Attack
Tirunagari et al. [25] DMD + LBP SVM Print-Attack
CASIA [18] LBP + 1D-FFT +HMOF
+Motion Correlation SVM Replay-Attack
LNMIIT [18] LBP + GMM + 2D-FFT SVM Replay-Attack
Feng et al. [12] HSC + Optical Flow NN Replay-Attack
Boulkenafet et al. [49] LPQ + Color SVM Casia Face Anti-Spoofing
Kose and Dugelay [43] LBP + Variational Retinex SVM Kose and Dugelay’s
Menotti et al. [61] DNN CNN 3DMask Attack
Feng et al. [12] HSC + Optical Flow NN 3DMask Attack
Kim et al. [46] MLBP + GLCM + IDA SVM MSU-MFSD
in experiments within a data set, Motion Correlation+MLP performs bet-
ter in experiments across different data sets, which seems to indicate that
not necessarily the best performing works for a specific data set, like the
ones shown in Table 14, are actually the best countermeasures. On the
other hand, they probably miss in terms of generalization power. Similar
results can be also found in Pinto et al. work [65]. Therefore, counter-
measures with good performance in cross-data set experiments – in the
absence of a truly challenging data set – are expected to be more effective
in real world scenarios. Current countermeasures, however, hardly beat a
random classifier (i.e. 50% HTER).
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Table 15: Cross-data set results (HTER) for Motion Correlation+MLP, as presented by
Pereira et al.[67].
Train
Test
Casia Face Anti-Spoofing Replay-Attack
Casia Face Anti-Spoofing 30.33% 50.25%
Replay-Attack 48.28% 11.79%
Table 16: Cross-data set results for LBP-TOP+SVM in HTER, as presented by Pereira et
al. [67].
Train
Test
Casia Face Anti-Spoofing Replay-Attack
Casia Face Anti-Spoofing 23.75% 50.64%
Replay-Attack 61.33% 8.51%
4.3. Future perspectives
Given the actual state of researches in face spoofing detection and the
observed trends, we would like to point some future directions that could
help other authors to address challenges that still need to be solved.
First, although texture-based solutions imported from face recognition
systems have the best results in experiments within a data set, their per-
formance rapidly degrade in experiments across different data sets [85].
Thus, designing solutions specifically for spoofing detection like the initial
works based on motion and reflectance seems to be a more promising way
of achieving reasonable generalization. This topic has being understud-
ied in the last years, but can find new stimuli in unexplored variations of
deep learning that may benefit from this kind of information, such as long
short-term memory networks [86] and Fourier CNNs [87].
Second, other learning frameworks could be explored to offer a different
perspective on how to solve this problem. Principles of lifelong [88] and
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transfer learning [89] have not been explored so far. Such techniques
would allow incorporating new samples into an existing model at any
time, making it more flexible to cover further attacks in the future without
retraining the entire classifier. In addition, clustering approaches [20] may
be an option to analyze massive amounts of data in unsupervised or semi-
supervised ways and could help to eventually discover unknown attacks
without exhaustive manual annotation.
Third, a large web collected corpus for spoofing detection in uncon-
trolled scenarios would give an immediate boost to this field and would
reduce overfitting problems related to data sets and/or attack types. More
than that, this corpus could be created as extension of existing wild face
recognition databases, such as Labeled Faces in the Wild [90], to allow
evaluating both recognition and spoofing detection simultaneously. To
this end, one may search the web looking for images of individuals from
of a chosen face recognition data set containing printed faces or even elab-
orate attacks like silicone masks and makeup disguises.
Finally, multimodal biometric systems are less likely to be spoofed as
impostors, since one has to forge multiple biometric features at the same
time. For this reason, different works addressed the impostor problem by
combining two or more human characteristics [91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97].
With this inmind, facial biometrics can be seen as a special case, since mul-
timodality can take advantage of multiple facial properties (e.g., texture,
shape and temperature) to avoid spoof attacks. Nowadays, different com-
mercially available devices are able to capture color, depth and infrared
images simultaneously at a reasonable price. These devices could be used
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to enhance current countermeasures, and possibly make them practicable
in industrial applications [98].
5. Conclusion
In this survey, we presented a compilation of face spoofing detection
works over the past decade, as well as, a thoroughly numerical and quali-
tative analysis. Spoofing attacks persist to be a security challenge for face
biometric systems, and there were much effort in the field to find robust
methods. However, all these efforts have been following the same recipe,
not favoring breakthroughs in the field. Many works of face spoofing
detection give emphasis on 2D attacks by presenting printed photos or
replaying recorded videos, and 3D attacks have been recently studied due
to the technological advancements in 3D printer and reconstruction. Al-
though perfect results on public data sets have been achieved by many
works, there is a considerable gap to move from academic researching to
real-world applications in a effective way. As such, it is expected that re-
searchers concentrate efforts to create more difficulty data sets and more
unbiased evaluation methods, henceforth.
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